Abstract. Access control is a fundamental concern in any system that manages resources, e.g., operating systems, file systems, databases and communications systems. The problem we address is how to specify, enforce, and implement access control in distributed environments. This problem occurs in many applications such as management of distributed project resources, e-newspaper and payTV subscription services.
INTRODUCTION
The domain we consider in this paper is that of distributed applications in environments such as distributed operating systems, distributed database systems, and communication networks where different users access different resources with different access rights. This problem is called distributed access control. Typical examples include access to rooms (e.g., class and lab) in a building, management of project resources, e-newspaper and payTV subscription services.
For example, in the context of management of project resource, users include directors, group leaders, project managers, technical managers, engineers, consultants, administrative staff, customers and accounting staff. Resources include financial data, intemal technical documents, public project documents, laboratories, etc. Different users have different access rights to different resources, which need to be concisely specified and correctly enforced.
Access control deals with the specification and enforcement of users' access permissions (and access restrictions) relative to the resources of a system. This is a fundamental concern in any system that manages resources, e.g., operating systems, file systems, databases and communications systems. Traditionally, access control is specified by an access relation (or "access matrix") that lists explicitly which users can access which resources.
In this paper we uncover a user hierarchy and a resource hierarchy, that are implicit in any access relation. Intuitively the hierarchies arise from the fact that some users have more access rights than others, and some resources carry more access constraints than others (a formal definition will be given later). We show that these hierarchies can give useful information.
Another contribution of this paper is an algorithm that merges these implicit user and resource hierarchies into a single hierarchy. This unified hierarchy contains the user and resource hierarchy as sub-hierarchies; moreover, a user is above a resource in the unified hierarchy if and only if this user has access to this resource. Thus the unified hierarchy contains all the information of the access relation, while also displaying the useful hierarchy information. In addition, the unified hierarchy merges 'equivalent' users, and merges 'equivalent' resources (rigorous definitions will be given); thus the unified hierarchy will usually be a compact description of the access rights.
Having a unified hierarchy can simplify access control. The literature contains secure access control protocols [I, 3, 6, 8, 101 that assume (without justification) that we have such a pre-existing unified hierarchy (see Subsection 3.4). We show how various secure access control schemes make use of hierarchy information in order to enforce access permissions and restrictions.
For a centralized system, access control is usually implemented by a centrally stored access table [2, 5, 7, 11, 121 . However, applications in distributed environments call for distributed access control (e.g., networks, Intemet, distributed databases, web services, distributed operating systems, satellite-TV, etc.). In Section 3 we give access control schemes that are specifically designed for distributed applications.
In this paper we do not consider the dynamics of access control (when users and resources are added and removed and when access rights change). Our results are applicable when systems change only slowly. Dynamical distributed access control is a very difficult problem that does not have easy solutions. We have been studying the problem by beginning with restricted domains and have proposed some dynamic hierarchical access control schemes for specific applications fields such as tree-hierarchies and secure group communications [ 131.
To illustrate the hierarchies we will use the following simple example, inspired from a college environment. The users, the resources, and the access relation (user-dominant adjacency lists) are given as follows (see box). We will derive a unified hierarchy for these relations in Section 2.
In the next section we define the user and resource hierarchies as well as the unified hierarchy and prove the existence and uniqueness of the unified hierarchy. In Section 3, we discuss the speci-fication of an access relation (in particular, using the unified hierarchy) and introduce three cryptography based schemes which enforce the access relation; these schemes use the unified hierarchy and are specifically designed for distributed applications.
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IMPLICIT HIERARCHIES IN AN ACCESS RELATION
A hierarchy is formalized by a directed acyclic graph (DAG), which defines a partial order ("hierarchical order") among vertices. A vertex vi is below a vertex vJ in the hierarchical order For a user U E U , let R(u) C R denote the set of resources that U can access; for a resource r 6 R , let U ( r ) C U denote the set of users that can access r . So, ( U , r ) E A is equivalent to T E R(u),-and also equivalent to U E U ( T ) . In the following, we assume that the complete access relation is known, and hence all the sets R(u) and U ( T ) are known.
The user and resource hierarchies are defined as follows: R(uj) (i.e., ui 
u i <U uj ifand only ifR(ui)
Note that the subset order is reversed for resources, compared to users.
The 'order' relations defined so far are in general not antisymmetric (i.e., z 5 y and z 2 y does not imply z = y; see e.g.,
[4]). To obtain partial orders we merge equivalent (ZU) users into single groups, and we merge equivalent resources into single groups. Note that the result is the same, whether we first merge equivalent users, and then equivalent resources, or vice-versa. From 0-7803-7097-1/01/$10.00 02001 IEEE
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now on, when we say "user" (or "resource"), we will mean a group of equivalent users (respectively, resources). The set of users U, the set of resources R, and the access relation A will refer to groups from now on.
Example: For our example from the Introduction, the Figures 1 and 2 represent the user and the resource hierarchies with several megers between users and resources, obtained from the access relation. We will now combine the user hierarchy and the resource hierarchy into a unified hierarchy, defined as follows: Definition 2. Let (U, < U ) and ( R , < R ) 
onz?JiffU(ui) 5 f U ( U j ) .
The following theorem shows that a unified hierarchy, as just defined, exists and is not larger than the combined size of the two original user and resource hierarchies.
We will use the notation x y to mean y 5 2. 
fr~(u~).
Also, clearly IV/ < IUI + IRI.
It is easy to implement the construction of (V, 5 ) in polynomial Minimality of (VI and uniqueness of the minimal unified hiertime; note that we need not consider all of 2R in the construction.
archy will follow from the following lemma. The two set-inclusions imply:
Then it follows from the Lemma above, that u and r are also identified in our construction of V above. So, our construction of V makes every identification that any minimum-size unified hierarchy V' will do, so our construction is of minimum-size too.
Uniqueness also follows: different minimal unified hierarchies can only differ in the way uz's are identified with r3's. But the Lemma tells us that this can only be done in one way.
r } R(u).
R(u) c {r3 E R : r j <R r } . 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS CONTROL
In this section we use the hierarchies that we introduced in order to develop secure access control schemes. Hierarchies can be used for both the specification and the enforcement of access control. In our enforcement schemes, a user uZ has to prove to a resource rj that ui has the right to access r j , and this should be possible if and only if rj 5 ui with respect to the unified hierarchy. We will present three 0-7803-7097-1/01/$10.00 02001 IEEE basic means to enforce access control: certificates, unconditionally secure keying schemes, and computationally secure keying schemes (based on one-way functions).
Specification of access control
An access control relation can be given explicitly, by an access matrix, which can be useful for theoretical reasonings but is wasteful for space. A more compact description of the access control relation can be given by adjacency lists: user-dominant adjacency lists or resource-dominant adjacency lists.
The un@d hierurchv can also be used to describe the access relation. In this case, the hierarchy is given as a graph in which every vertex is labeled by the set of equivalent user:; or resources (or some of both) that are represented by this vertex. Because of the merger of equivalent users or resources, and the merger of some users with some resources, the unified hierarchy is a representation which is as compact as (and usually more compact than) the adjacency list representation. Moreover, the unified hierarchy has the advantage that certain queries are more efficient: Given a u:jer ui or a resource rj it is easy to find the adjacency list of ui or rj (namely, pick all the resources that are 5 ui, respectively, all the: users that are t rj).
In the user-dominant adjacency list representation, it is tedious to find a resource's adjacency list; on the other hand, if both userand resource-dominant adjacency lists are explicitly given, storage is wasted. In the rare cases when no mergers occur, the unified hierarchy loses its compactness advantage (however, one still has to consider the concepts and go through some of the construction of the unified hierarchy, in order to find out that no users are merged with resources). In any case, the unified hierarchy keeps an advantage regarding queries. Thus, the unified hierarchy could serve as a representation of the access relation, which is both compact and efficient for queries.
Various mixed representations of the access relation are also possible: we might be given partial information about adjacency lists, about the user and resource hierarchies, or information about equivalence of some users or some resources. This may arise in specifications, and one could be asked to reconstruct the entire unified hierarchy from these data.
In a distributed environment, partial information about the access relation or the unified hierarchy will be distributed among the users and the resources; no central authority is needed (except may be at the set-up of the system or for occasional maintenance and updates).
In the next three subsections we give schemes for enforcing an access relation.
Certificate-based schemes
In these schemes a trusted certificate authority (CA) distributes certificates to users. When a user accesses a resource the protocol is as follows: the user provides an access request along with a certificate. The resource then verifies the user's access right based on this certificate (without consulting the CA).
It is natural to assume that users know which resources they can access. A user ut may have a certificate of the following form for each resource r j that 21% can access:
Here, u2's ID identifies the user, ( U , , r j ) indicates the access right, and the CA's digital signature certifies to the resource that the information in the certificate is correct. We refer to books on cryptography for more information on certificates and digital signatures (e.g., [ u t ' s ID, ( u , . r 3 ) , c e r t . -valid-time, CA-sig. ] ~91).
Alternatively, instead of having a different certificate for each resource that u2 can access, ut might have just one certificate that lists all of R(u,) (i.e., all the resources accessible tow,%). This approach may be simpler when the number of resources is small; but it gives more information to a resource than this resource needs to know. In any case, no information about the access relation or the hierarchies needs to be stored in the resources.
A disadvantage of this scheme comes from a general problem with certificates: it is hard to keep certificates up to date when the system changes (the revocation problem -see [9] ).
Unconditionally secure keying schemes
In this approach every vertex U in the unified hierarchy has a key IC,. Moreover, depending on the unified hierarchy order 5 , each user at v knows a set of keys U, C {kW : w 5 U } (i.e., the user knows some keys of lower-ranking resources), and each resource at vertex U knows a set of keys R, C {kW : U 5 w} (i.e., some: keys of higher-ranking users); the sets U, and R, should be chosen in such a way that vi 5 v j if and only if U,, r l Rut # 0.
Moreover, the sets U, and R, should be such that one cannot guess any key contained in any of these sets. In particular, we assume that the keys IC, are long enough so that they cannot be guessed.
When a user uj (at vertex v j ) requests a resource ri (at vertex vi) he presents his set UUj to the resource; the resource then checks whether Uvj n Rv7 # 0, which holds if and only if vi 5 v j , iie., if and only if u3 has the right to access ri. (In this protocol, a resource can get information about the keying material held by users; this could however be avoided by adding 'challenge-response' methods into the protocol -see [9] .)
We will illustrate this approach by simple special cases, namely 'user multiple keying', 'resource multiple keying', and 'mixed keying'.
User multiple keying:
In this scheme we have for every vertex U : R, = {k,} and This scheme can also be implemented by directly using the access relation: Then for every resource r and every user U we have R, = {k,} and U, = {IC,? : U can access r j } .
A user U requesting access to a resource r presents U, to r. The resource r verifies U'S access right by checking whether IC, E U,.
For example (see Figure 4) 
Resource multiple keying:
of user and resources switched.
This scheme is similar to User multiple keying, with the roles
Mixed keying:
This is the general case. For example (see Figure 5) 
CONCLUSION
We showed that three hierarchies can be extracted from an access relation: a user hierarchy, a resource hierarchy, and a unified hierarchy. These hierarchies allow compact specifications of access control, and are useful for schemes that enforce an access relation. Cryptographic key-based hierarchical schemes can be designed to effectively enforce and implement access control in distributed environments. Other issues such as general dynamic access control and specification of negative access relations are challenging problems which we plan to investigate in the future. 
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One-way function based keying schemes
A drawback of the unconditionally secure schemes presented above is that the total amount of secret information that the users or the resources have to store can be quite large (proportional to the number of vertices in the unified hierarchy). One-way functions can drastically improve this. We present one way of using one-way functions, namely a generalization of Lin's scheme [8] . Other methods could be generalized as well by using the the unified hierarchy (e.g., the scheme of Akl and Taylor [l]).
A generalization of Lin's scheme
Lin's original scheme [8] assumed that the user hierarchy and the resource hierarchy were the same. However, we do not need this assumption; we will simply apply Lin's method to the unified hierarchy (V, 5 ) . Moreover, we will use any one-way function F : K x I + K, where I is the space of vertex identifiers ('IDS'), and K is a large key space.
Every vertex v E V is assigned its own independent key IC, E K. Only v is explicitly given IC, .
For all vertices U , w such that w 5 w, let T,, = F(k,, U) @ k,, where @ is bitwise exclusive OR. If w $ w, we choose T,, to be a random element of K. In any case, the elements (r,,, U , w) (as v and w range over V) are made public. The one-way function F is also made public. Now, if v 5 w then w can compute IC,, using IC, (which w knows) and rVw (which is public): k , = F ( k , , U ) @ r,,.
On the other hand, if w $ w, the element T,, is random and carries no information (and the relations r,, = F ( k , , w) @ IC, and k, = F(IC,, w) @ rvw do not hold, with high probability). A user associated with vertex w accesses a resource associated with vertex w by presenting k, to w. (Lin used a more special one-way function, which required some set-up work, namely F ( k , , U ) = gku&+N< mod p , where p is a large prime number, g is a primitive element mod p , and N, is a numerical identifier of w.)
The advantages of this scheme are that every vertex can select its own key and a vertex does not need to remember the entire hierarchy.
